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Abstract 
 
The current state of the office of the Electoral Commission (EC) of Ghana can be couched as a bleed-
ing pillar in Ghana’s electoral democracy pending crisis. In spite of the numerous reform measures 
undertaken by the EC to improve the quality delivery of its constitutional mandate, communication 
deficit and the increasing monetization of parliamentary and presidential contestation poses a seri-
ous threat to broader participation and competition in Ghana's future electoral fortune. Thus, the 
objective of the paper was to interrogate the issues of communication inefficiencies and monetiza-
tion of political contestations by the Electoral Commission of Ghana and proffer pragmatic solutions 
that can be taken into consideration in years ahead due to the past and recent experiences of neigh-
bouring countries within the sub-region. The study employed the qualitative research methodology 
to elicit responses from 12 experts in the field of elections. Apart from the primary data generated 
from the field, secondary sources were consulted to situate the discussion in the existing debate in the 
literature. The findings of the study revealed that monetization of the political contest has negative 
implications for a competitive political contest--disqualification of citizens with capable minds from 
contesting in a multi-party democracy) whilst communication deficit was found to be deepening 
public distrust in the Electoral Commission of Ghana. The study, therefore, recommended among oth-
ers the creation of a three-man office solely responsible for managing the commission's website and 
other electronic outlets, and the immediate activation and implementation of the provision in the 
2020 Strategic Plan of the Electoral Commission which has remained dormant after 2016 elections.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Globally, Election Management Body 
(EMBs) have proven to be the institutions 
on which electoral democracy and its con-
solidation hinge upon. The most valued 
quality of any EMB however, is its credi-
bility, which can significantly increase 
election security, increased the legitimacy 
of electoral outcomes and reduce the risk 
of "political turmoil" (Cyllah, 2014). In 
principle, an EMB must adhere to a value 
of "openness and accountability, trans-
parency and disclosure" just as required 
for political parties and contesting candi-
dates (Goodwin-Gill, 1998). Deductively, 
the failure to observe these sacred tenets 
enjoining professionalism and independ-
ence of the EMBs can cripple democratic 
gains and destroy democratic norms giv-
ing way to democratic instability. 
A work of Larry Diamond projects a 
global democratic recession, which im-
plied a potential tip-over into a much 
worse scenario that could see the failure 
of democracy, not only in poor countries 
(Africa) but also in the big wigs such as 
Indonesia and Ukraine (Diamond, 2015). 
Additionally, he noted that the unprece-
dented cost of election campaigns, the 
heaving role of “non-transparent money” 
in politics, and increasing levels of voter 
apathy are other signs of democratic mis-
fortunes (Diamond, 2015).   
Relatedly Foa & Mounk (2017) fore-
sees a likelihood of democratic deconsoli-
dation where growing democracies and 
highly democratic countries alike could 
give way to authoritarian regimes, though 
the level of consolidation will determine 
the pace of deconsolidation. They further 
observed, although democracy has come 
to be the solitary kind of government 
widely seen as legitimate, it has lost the 
confidence of many citizens who no long-
er consider that democracy can deliver on 
their most pressing demands and inter-
ests. That is, the enthusiastic assessment 
that this decline in trust simply repre-
sents a momentary recession is no more 
than “a pleasing assumption, based in 
part on a reluctance to call into question 
the vaunted stability of affluent democra-
cies.” (Foa & Mounk, 2017).  
Additionally, a recent publication by 
Freedom House in early 2018 shows that 
there is a serious worldwide democratic 
crisis which cut across the basic princi-
ples of democracy. In the view of the pres-
ident of Freedom House, Michael J. 
Abramowitz, the minimal ideals of de-
mocracy encompassing the assurance of 
“free and fair elections, the rights of mi-
norities, freedom of the press, and the 
rule of law—are under siege around the 
world” (Freedom in the World Report, 
2018). In the same vein, the Report saw 
that about 71 states experience net de-
clines in political rights and civil liberties, 
whilst only 35 countries registered gains, 
of the 195 countries which were exam-
ined (Freedom in the World Report, 
2018)  
Significantly, electoral regimes are 
argued to be indispensable fundamentals 
in democratic regimes (Dahl, 2005; Mer-
kel, 2004; Bogaards, 2009). Available lit-
erature also shows that ‘Democracy’ is 
incomplete without elections (Sandbrook 
2000; Diamond, Linz & Lipset, 1989;   
Sorensen, 1993) and thus, the office of the 
Electoral Commission as an independent 
and autonomous body to manage elec-
tions in Ghana is necessary for the surviv-
al of democracy. Hence, for Ghana’s elec-
toral democracy to deepen, the EC must 
be independent, impartial, professional 
and transparent such that ‘the rules of the 
game’ is applied fairly, particularly where 
there are very important positions in the 
country that must be contested for. Con-
versely, the failure of an EMB (EC) to or-
ganize free and fair elections may lead to 
the destruction of “public’s faith” in the 
idea of multi-party democracy and the 
consolidation processes (Ayee, 1998) and 
a democratic reversal may be inevitable 
(Smith, 1960; Gyekye-Jandoh, 2013).   
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In the scholarly works of Dahl, 
(2005), Merkel, (2004), & Bogaards, 
(2009), electoral regimes are indispensa-
ble fundamentals in democratic regimes. 
But, can there be an electoral regime 
without existing Election Management 
Bodies (EMBs)? Arguably no, EMBs are 
central and important elements of elec-
toral regimes even though they are not 
the only variables that matter in the con-
duct of elections in democratic regimes 
(Merkel 2004; Schmitter 1995). Further-
more, Frempong (2015) observed that 
“election administration is the thin line 
that separates the success and failure of 
transitional elections and that the charac-
ter, competence, and composition of the 
electoral management body can deter-
mine whether an election becomes a 
source of peaceful change or cause of seri-
ous instability.”   
Significantly, democracy once on it 
wheels should progress rather than retro-
gress. Thus, situating earlier paragraphs 
in the context of Electoral Democratic 
Consolidation is not just desirable but 
necessary. This minimalist conception 
routed in the works of Adam Przeworski 
(1991) and Samuel Huntington (1991) 
places more emphasis on elections, an en-
terprise for which EMBs are the central 
figure. The adoption of this criterion for 
democratic consolidation is due to the 
fact that in most African countries 
(including Ghana) elections are very im-
portant to the peace, stability and to the 
continuation of democratic process. That 
is to say, most African countries have 
fragile institutions:  it is either they have 
witnessed democratic reversal by over-
throwing constitutionally elected govern-
ments or engaged in acts of secessionist 
movements or, the entrenchment of elect-
ed rulers to the seat of government with 
the intentions of manipulating political 
rules to consolidate their selfish parochial 
interest.  By dint of this, countries seen to 
be practising democracy are mostly 
caught in the web of Electoralism with 
little or no attention to the issue of gov-
ernance.  Unarguably, the basic but crucial 
role of an Election Management Body is to 
lay a platform that allows for citizens to 
exercise their franchise within an institu-
tionalized framework. These bodies be-
come relevant when elections become a 
critical measure of democratic strides 
worldwide. 
The literature shows that, most 
countries in the African Continent are 
caught within the sphere of electoralism 
(Botchway & Kwarteng, 2018) such that 
democratic governing is perceived in lim-
ited scope to mean who occupies the seat 
of government or who is selected through 
electioneering structure within a space of 
time to allocate state resources and steer 
the processes of major decision in the 
country that applies to them. But the ar-
gument and emphasis of periodic or regu-
lar elections over the years have shifted 
to the question of quality and how free 
and fair, inclusive and legitimate electoral 
outcomes are likely to be (Malunga, 
2016). Thus, inasmuch as Ghana conducts 
periodic elections, it is not enough 
grounds to write-off the likelihood of its 
outcome being illegitimate, and so con-
stant reforms and reviews are needed to 
improve the efficiency and effectiveness 
of the electoral process.   
Indeed, Civil Conflict that has elec-
toral and political underpinnings are com-
mon in sub-Saharan Africa (Dupas & Rob-
inson, 2012; Blattman & Miguel, 2010). 
Though, Ghana has not experienced these 
crises yet, the Kenyan and Ivorian experi-
ence (the controversial declaration of 
Mwai Kibaki and Laurent Gbagbo by the 
Electoral Commission of Kenya and Ivory 
Coast as the winners of keenly contested 
elections.) in 2007 and 2011 respectively, 
shows that Ghana is not immune to possi-
ble democratic reversal if the Ghanaian 
EC does not work assiduously in unfilled 
gaps (communication and Monetization) 
to avert any uneventful situations that 
could thwart Ghana’s democratic feat. Es-
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pecially, when the evidence from neigh-
bouring countries and the region by ex-
tension have revealed that failures elec-
tioneering processes decline public trust 
in the institutions responsible for over-
seeing elections (Election Management 
Body). 
For this reason, irrespective of the 
enviable successes attained by Ghana 
electorally, the EC remains a sensitive and 
critical actor in the failure and/or success 
of electoral outcomes. Of course, the role 
of the Security agencies, Judicial Service, 
Media, CSOs and citizens are key but they 
do not declare elections. This explains 
why the paper put the Electoral Commis-
sion of Ghana in the centre of the discus-
sion this paper in spite of the fact some 
African countries like Mali, Kenya, Tanza-
nia, Burkina Faso, Burundi, among others 
have experienced shocks in their demo-
cratic foundations.  
The coming into force of the 1992 
Constitution of Ghana necessitated the 
provisions for the establishment of the 
office of the Electoral Commission (EC) by 
an Act of Parliament in 1993, as the man-
dated independent and autonomous body 
with the exclusive powers of overseeing 
elections in the Republic of Ghana. The 
mandate of the EC was to ensure that 
there is a fair play in the competition for 
people's votes. Perhaps, its inception sig-
nalled the hope that some reform 
measures would be undertaken to pre-
vent the features of fraudulent elections 
under the office of INEC-Ghana from re-
peating itself, in the process of consolidat-
ing elections and democracy in Ghana.  
Since its inception, the literature 
makes it clear that the EC has made con-
siderable efforts to progressively accentu-
ate the need for consolidating democracy 
by organizing periodic free and fair elec-
tions, carrying out public education, ex-
panding voters register, creating new 
constituencies among others. For in-
stance, the Electoral Commission (EC) has 
contributed to Ghana's impressive 
achievements in building the foundations 
for democratic governance which has re-
sulted in six successive general elections. 
As noted by Gyimah-Boadi (2009), the ob-
jectivity, independence and administra-
tive capability of the Ghanaian (EC) has 
gradually improved election by election, 
whilst levels of public interest in the gen-
eral elections remain high.   
Fobih (2011) espoused that the limi-
tations to the drive of Ghana's democratic 
deepening hinge greatly on the institu-
tional arrangements and the failure or the 
inability of emerging political parties or 
smaller political parties to wrestle for 
power boot-for-boot with the two domi-
nant political parties to create a vibrant 
multiparty Democracy.  From this argu-
ment, one would expect that aside the 
smaller political parties; effort could be 
made to a state fund for political parties 
to enable smaller parties to contest effec-
tively, but that has not been the case. 
Fobih by way of recommendation argued 
for equal and level playing ground for po-
litical parties to allow for competitive 
contestations since that could gradually 
deepen electoral democracy (Fobih, 
2011).   
Notably, Amedeker (2013), ob-
served that Ghana's democratic strides 
stem from the recognition and reverence 
for both political and civil right, and the 
commitment of Electoral Commission to 
constantly undertake credible steps to-
wards the democratic consolidation busi-
ness by instituting and laying out mecha-
nisms to ensure political participation 
and reforms since its inception. Relatedly, 
Okra (2015) in his published thesis con-
firmed the works of (The World Govern-
ance Index, 2014 and Gyimah-Boadi, 
2009) that EC has contributed positively 
to ensuring free and fair elections in Gha-
na. However, sustaining this feat requires 
putting in place the right communication 
mechanism to relay accurate and timely 
information to the political stakeholders 
and the citizens who are a major stake-
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holder in democratic deepening and sus-
tenance. It is within this scope and light 
that the paper focuses on communication 
deficit that characterizes the office of the 
Electoral Commission. 
A conference paper of Gyampo 
(2018) titled "Managing the Possibility of 
Election Overload In Ghana, 2018 -2021" 
focussed on the likely challenge overloads 
on Electoral Commission of Ghana ahead 
of several elections that are outstanding 
between the period of 2018 and 2021. 
Concluding that the EC is overburden 
with so much responsibility and thus the 
president's directive to conduct elections 
for Metropolitan, Municipal and District 
Chief Executives (MMDCEs) has greater 
potentials of deepening the “unending 
electoral cycle” of Ghana (Gyampo, 2018)  
which is likely to reduce the quality of 
elections in the country.   
Even though literature on the Elec-
toral Commission of Ghana abound rang-
ing from the political conflict, democratic 
consolidation, electoral reforms, voter ed-
ucations, political parties and internal 
conflicts, democratic governance pro-
spects and challenges, to Political Vigilan-
tism, little attention have been given to 
the space of monetization of political con-
test (the only work that sought to exten-
sively explore this aspect is the 2018 Feb-
ruary report by the Westminster Founda-
tion in conjunction with the Center for 
Democratic Development (CDD)—the 
Cost of Politics in Ghana) and communica-
tion deficit which could be a recipe for 
democratic reversal, if uncheck.  For in-
stance, the Afrobarometer 2016 report 
under the caption “Election quality, public 
trust are central issues for Africa’s up-
coming contests” revealed a very minimal 
trust in the Election Management Body in 
their respective countries. According to 
Penar, Aiko, Bentley & Han (2016), of the 
36 countries which were survey, an aver-
age of 50% was seen to have trust in the 
Election Management Body of their re-
spective countries: 25% said “A lot”, an-
other 25% said ”Somewhat”, 23% said “A 
little”, a significant 22% said ”Not at all” 
whilst 6% said ”Don’t Know”. Interesting-
ly and unfortunately, Ghana the hailed 
and admired West African country so far 
as electoral democracy is concerned rec-
orded a lower trust level of 37% in the 
Electoral Commission (Penar, Aiko, Bent-
ley & Han, 2016).  
Obviously, considering the state of 
disbelief in the office of the Electoral 
Commission, one would expect effective 
communication from the EC to offset and 
dispel misconceptions within the political 
environment. Failure to do so can lead to 
undesirable outcomes that can impede 
and subsequently erode Ghana's efforts 
towards the consolidation of electoral de-
mocracy. It is for this reason that the 
choice of country and topic is justified. 
This notwithstanding is important to 
point out that no institution is perfect and 
would, therefore, need "constant re-
engineering" to make function at the most 
desirable level (Gyampo & Asare, 2015). 
Therefore, the paper aims at examining 
the current state of the Electoral Commis-
sion of Ghana, primarily focusing on EC's 
communication deficits; monetization of 
parliamentary and presidential contests 
(MPPCs) and likely implications for Gha-
na's democratic future. 
RESEARCH METHODS 
The study was purely qualitative and 
merited a response from 12 experts, se-
lected through purposive sampling due to 
the sensitive nature of the paper. Of the 
12 respondents, 3 were highly-rated elec-
toral officials, 4 representatives of the 
four dominant political parties in Ghana 
(1 each), 3 were representatives from 
three Civil Society Organizations, and 2 
were Political Scientists. Notably, Cre-
swell (2013) explained that the core of 
qualitative study lies in its analytical as-
sessment of phenomena to enable the re-
searcher to create an all-inclusive and a 
vivid picture of that phenomenon such 
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that the processes and outcomes provide 
deeper insight into that phenomena and 
how it reflects the “outside world”. In this 
vein, a qualitative approach was more 
suited for this study since it allowed the 
researcher more room to operate. Fur-
ther, it helped the researcher to distil ob-
jectivity from subjectivity through logical 
inferences rather than to follow narrow 
measurements and rigid impositions of 
quantitative methods (Engel & Schutt, 
2009). Moreover, data derived from the 
use of the qualitative approach gave life to 
the research question and objectives of 
the study. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The Electoral Commission and Commu-
nication deficit 
For the first time in the history of 
Ghana, the Electoral Commission institut-
ed a strategic plan to become a "World 
Class, Trusted and Independent Electoral 
Commission” (Electoral Commission Gha-
na Strategic Plan 2016 – 2020) within the 
period of 2016 and 2020. This was 
launched in the heat of several allegations 
surrounding the appointment of its chair-
person, Mrs Charlotte Osei. Indeed, a 
clearly defined goal is ideal since the vari-
ous variables and element could join to-
gether to reach a destination of excel-
lence.  The strategic plan, therefore, 
aimed to deliver the Commission's man-
date, equipping the staff, effective utiliza-
tion of the available resources the Com-
mission have, the various processes, espe-
cially, technology and finally the brand of 
the Commission. This section, therefore, 
assesses the state of the EC against the 
five-year Strategic Plan after seventeen 
(17) months of launching and implemen-
tation. Though this exercise may be con-
sidered premature, it is a prudent endeav-
our to track the progress or dormancy of 
the strategic plan to enable the Commis-
sion to up their game in working fervently 
towards the achievement of their target. 
No empire is built in a day and so for the 
commission to achieve its target, 17 
months is fair to assess the journey so far. 
As part of the strategic plan, effec-
tive communication was highlighted as a 
very important component to address ru-
mours and conjectures which more often 
than not replaces fact. A journey in a mile-
stone is often said to start with a step, but 
from all indications, nothing impressive 
can be said about the Commission as far 
as communication both internally and ex-
ternally are concerned. The IDEG official 
revealed that the EC has not done enough 
to show that the communications aspect 
of the World Class Strategic Plan will be 
achieved in the next 26 or 27 months 
ahead of 2020 elections in spite of the fact 
that the head of communications was 
changed prior to 2016 for reasons of not 
being proactive and ineffective communi-
cation. 
On the contrary, the change did not 
bring a drastic shift to an improved com-
munication since levels of inconsistencies 
in the communications of the EC persist-
ed. This came to a head in during the 
2016 general election press briefing; 
where the Head of the EC Communica-
tions, Mr Eric Dzakpasu clarified the si-
lence of the EC in a press conference, stat-
ing that electoral results that made it way 
to the National Coalition Center has sever-
al allegations of over voting across the 
country and the issues are been investi-
gated—this inaccurate information 
heightened the tension in the country par-
ticularly when no such allegations were 
made at the polling stations. The issue 
was compounded by the Commission’s 
Chair Person, Mrs Charlotte Osei that an 
Electronic Results Transmission System 
(ERTS) for the 2016 elections has been 
compromised. The information came as 
surprised since the EC did not communi-
cate to stakeholders that there were re-
engagement with some IT firms to per-
form this task. The data revealed that the 
EC was not satisfied with presentations of 
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all the IT firms that responded to the bid 
of handing the Electronic Results Trans-
mission System (ERTS) proposed by the 
Electoral Reform Committee. Thus, for the 
EC to take a unilateral decision was sur-
prising and unethical.  
The largest platform the Commis-
sion engages with external actors or 
stakeholders in through the Interparty 
Advisory Committee (IPAC). However, for 
effective dissemination of information 
commission has instituted the Regional 
Interparty Advisory Committee (RIPAC) 
and the Interparty Advisory Committee 
(DIPAC). The RIPAC and the DIPAC espe-
cially have been dormant and ineffective 
due to the lack of offices in some districts 
or malfunctioning district offices of the 
Electoral Commission across the country 
(Ghana). 
The IDEG and CODEO officials in-
cluding the Political Scientist who were 
interviewed expressed that, the decisions 
at the national level (IPAC) does not trick-
le down to the RIPAC and DIPAC because 
most of the parties are not so organized 
into these sections to constitute a formi-
dable front for the dissemination of infor-
mation. Additionally, it was revealed that 
the meetings are not done properly due to 
the lack of district offices of political par-
ties across the country. Thus, one would 
expect that the EC would have started 
working in this regard but no significant 
efforts have been made to this effect. 
To illustrate, for instance, at least 
from January to May 2017, there had not 
been any proper IPAC meetings, the EC 
had not published the official election re-
sults for 2016 and there no communica-
tions coming from the Commission, a de-
velopment which was in sharp contrast to 
the traditions of the EC before the con-
duct of the 2016 elections.  Moreover, the 
absence of communication and dormancy 
in dealing with the stakeholders leads to 
suspicion which is not good for the Com-
mission’s effort to instil trust and trans-
parency in the discharge of its mandate 
the people.  
The PPP official, expressed that the 
failure of the commission to engage politi-
cal parties in IPAC meeting for close to 
five months after elections very strange 
because before and during the 2016 elec-
tions, the EC Chair was very vociferous in 
responding to claims and allegations but 
the EC seems to have suddenly gone to 
sleep. This view questions the integrity of 
the EC Chair which supports the dwin-
dling stakeholder trust in the Commission 
and how it operates. The finding confirms 
Penar, Aiko, Bentley & Han (2016) in the 
analysis of the worsening decline in EMB 
trust in West Africa. 
Similarly, the data revealed that 
there is no formal way in which the Civil 
Society Organizations (CSOs) are engaged 
by the EC like the way the EC engages the 
political parties (the EC engages political 
parties in a monthly IPAC meetings and 
also in the fortnights before elections 
dates, however, no such formal platform 
exist for election-related CSOs in Ghana). 
But elections are not organized solely for 
political but most importantly for the peo-
ple.  
The Election-related CSOs who vol-
unteered their responses argued that the 
engagement of CSOs on a formal platform 
can enrich debates and decisions of the 
EC since they have representatives and 
officials in the across the grassroots in the 
country who constantly engage the peo-
ples and the information they present are 
more likely to be credible and authentic.  
According to the IDEG official, it is 
expected that the EC interact with the 
CSOs who represent the people who vote 
on a regular basis, but this expectation 
seems to have either eluded the EC or is 
on the blind spot of the Commission, and 
as a result, no effort has been made to pe-
riodically interact with CSOs who will, in 
turn, disseminate the information to the 
general populace, even if the interactions 
of the Commission with the CSOs may not 
be as regular that of the political parties.  
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That is to say, there should be a bal-
ance interaction between the EC and the 
Political Parties on one hand and the in-
teractions on the EC with the people rep-
resented by the CSOs on the other so that 
the CSOs would not be called upon only 
when their services become relevant to 
the Commission. Though the Political Sci-
entists considered this move as brilliant, 
they were concerned were concerned 
about space, cost and wondering what 
difference joining the IPAC meetings on a 
single platform will make. One of the Po-
litical Scientists argued that the EC some-
times have discretionary powers 
(unilateral decision) in spite of the pro-
ceeding at the IPAC meeting and so if civil 
societies groups have a concern, they can 
equally put it in writing as has been the 
norm but not necessarily being present at 
the meetings. 
Of course, cutting cost is equally im-
portant as effective communication. From 
a neutral standpoint, the political parties 
are salespersons and will most often than 
not sell what they want citizens to hear. 
However, the EC as the referee has most 
often delayed communicating to the citi-
zens directly on fallouts of IPAC meetings. 
The Media and CSOs on the hand have the 
fastest means of disseminating infor-
mation and thus being a part of IPAC 
meetings to pick ‘first-hand information' 
and disseminate them accurately is far 
better than waiting on press release from 
the Commission when the inaccurate in-
formation has already been spread by po-
litical parties to their supporters and citi-
zens have formed their opinions. The call 
could be a crucial way of improving com-
munication and refining the dissemina-
tion of information as well as reducing 
stakeholder’s distrust.  
Additionally, the EC sought to im-
prove communications through the use of 
technology. However, the necessary infor-
mation that ought to be at the Commis-
sion's Websites are not readily available. 
The Website is noted for constant shut-
down and this gives room for the circula-
tion of information that is not credible. 
For more than six months after the EC had 
declared the 2016 election results, the of-
ficial election result was not available on 
the EC's Website. Here again, the EC 
seems to be failing to make significant 
progress that shows a path to the achieve-
ment of the Strategic Plan by 2020. The 
Former EC Chairman admitted the chal-
lenge and explained that communication 
is a serious challenge the commission has 
been working from time to time to im-
prove but the challenge is most often the 
delays and timely release of the infor-
mation. The fear of figures generating 
contradictions within the polarized politi-
cal sphere calls for double-check and data 
verification data, which unfortunately de-
lays the process. 
The deductions from this argument 
point to the fact that the EC has not de-
vised effective means of generating and 
aggregating data. This slows communica-
tion leaving room for disseminating false 
interpretations. Moreover, not everyone 
could drive to the headquarters of the EC 
to access authentic information in the 
name of ‘what the people will say.’ The 
citizens deserve quick access to accurate 
information in order to build total trust in 
the Commission, the reverse is always 
detrimental to the trust and integrity the 
people accord to the Electoral Commis-
sion. 
It is worth noting that before the ap-
pointments of new EC Chairpersons, the 
Commission's head and two deputies 
were divided against themselves and for 
that matter, no effective communication 
could exist. The evidence points to fact 
that there was a clash of personality and 
this created friction between the three 
(the Chairperson and the two deputies) in 
terms of building consensus on critical 
electoral issues including procurement. 
This was because the two deputies were 
familiar with the organizational culture 
whilst the then Chair, Mrs Charlotte Osei 
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was more or less a novice to the electoral 
game (elections). Unfortunately, the com-
munication deficit between them is be-
lieved to have deepened the rivalry be-
tween them.  
Thus, the new Commissioners would 
have to develop innovative ways of en-
forcing the communication plans and 
strategies outlined in the 2020 Strategic 
Plan or devise an effective means of inter-
acting among themselves as well as inter-
acting with political parties, CSO, the Me-
dia and the Citizens at large to restore the 
image of the EC which has being smeared 
in fraudulent transactions and misappro-
priations—partly as a result of ineffective 
communication among the immediate 
past heads of the Electoral Commission of 
Ghana. The move will further improve 
communication, enhance credibility and 
ensure sanctity and accuracy of the dis-
seminated information between now and 
the next elections in the year 2020.  
The failure of the EC to Gazette Election 
2016 Results new developments 
The Electoral Commission against its 
normal tradition did not gazette the 2016 
election results for more than 6 months 
from the day declaration of election re-
sults. The situation was alarming because 
anybody could have challenged the elec-
tion result. This notwithstanding, polling 
station results were not published until 
after 6months. The critical question here 
is, how were the 2016 elections declared 
and with what data was the final compu-
tations done? The Commission is indeed 
in crises and a lot has to be done to sal-
vage it from crumbling. It is daunting for 
an EMB like the Ghanaian EC to conduct 
elections and publish national and region-
al results without polling station results. 
The failure of the EC to gazette leads 
to another question as to what mecha-
nism the EC employed to gather and ag-
gregate polling station, constituency, and 
regional election results to arrive at the 
final results that declared President Akufo 
Addo as the winner of the 2016 election 
contest. Another question that has still 
not been answered is to what extent did 
the compromised electronic transmission 
noted by the Commission’s Chair during a 
press briefing in 2016 affected the results 
that were transmitted through that chan-
nel.  
Again, from the responses of the 
CSOs, Political Scientists, One of former 
deputy EC and the political parties’ inter-
view with the exception of the NDC offi-
cial, there were several infractions in the 
2016 elections, but the landslide victory 
for the New Patriotic Party (NPP) created 
a low tempo in the political environment. 
To illustrate, the PPP official expressed 
disappointment in the electoral; the elec-
toral system is such that some persons 
were able to trigger electoral thievery 
which has been deepening and it came to 
its peak during the  2012 and 2016 could 
have been worse since the election rig-
ging has progressed.  This observation 
can sink into the deterioration of stake-
holder trust in the Electoral system. This 
tends to confirm the observation of Penar, 
Aiko, Bentley & Han (2016) on the decline 
of trust in EMBs in Africa. 
However, the perspective of the for-
mer EC Chair disagrees with the opinion 
of the PPP official and other political par-
ties who were not explicit with expres-
sions on these grounds, first, Election is a 
big deal with multifaceted happening and 
this necessitated the introduction of the 
“counting at the polling stations” to re-
solve problems with the results at the 
polling station. The system makes it easy 
to trace particular mistakes by following 
the records at the polling station and this 
system was being built systematically 
over the and now it has really come to 
stay. 
Second, unless there is an obvious 
mistake with the results, all other unclear 
mistakes or disputes over results have to 
be proven with empirical evidence and 
facts either with the commission or in 
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court because the commission is the least 
party to rig elections in Ghana.  Most im-
portantly, he noted that “elections are 
won or lost at the polling station" is not 
new to the political parties since it is 
mostly stressed— the power is in the 
hands of the so when the polling station 
agents: what they endorse is the real fact 
and cannot be disputed. 
The above, notwithstanding, the 
Commission currently has a new phase 
following the dismissal of Mrs Charlotte 
Osei and her two deputies as recommend-
ed by the chief justice's committee after 
the completion of an investigation into a 
fraudulent and corruption allegation 
brought against the EC chair by the mem-
bers of the commission and the two depu-
ty Chairpersons of the Electoral Commis-
sion were found to be credible and factu-
al. The implication of this development 
has greater chances of deteriorating pub-
lic trust further. The point is that, since 
the inception of the Commission, it is the 
first time the Electoral Commission's 
Chair and her deputies have been sacked. 
The question now is, will a change in per-
sonnel positively salvage the declining 
faith in the office or a new era for more 
disaster? Interestingly, the newly ap-
pointed leaders of the commission have 
signed two years bond and forge ahead 
towards the 2020 general elections of 
Ghana whilst a referendum lingers on the 
neck of the in December 2018. 
Aside this, about two (2) of the 
members of the EC  are due for retirement 
before 2020, what this means is that the 
NPP government again will have to ap-
point three people to fill up the space cre-
ated by the compulsory retirement of the 
three members of the commission. The 
most obvious will be that the NPP would 
have appointed six (6) members out of 
seven-member Commission (One Com-
mission chair, her two deputies and three 
shall be the replacement to the three re-
tirees). What will the posturing and level 
of trust of the opposition political parties 
and their fanatic supporters on the re-
constituted Electoral Commission in a 
highly politicized country like Ghana 
ahead of the 2020 general elections? The 
challenge, therefore, remains with how 
this new commissioner within limited 
time will synergize the World Class Stra-
tegic Plan, which is the focus and target 
for the outgone administration with their 
new strategy ahead of the 2020 general 
elections. Given that, the new Commission 
will stick to the World Class Strategic 
plan, implementation will be difficult 
since a lot of time will need to learn and 
familiarize themselves with the stipulated 
procedures that have been instituted by 
the current Electoral Commission. 
A deduction from the legitimate 
questions and the analysis above, danger 
looms ahead of Ghana's election 2020 if 
the right measures are not taken to arrest 
any eventualities. The Institution of the 
Electoral Commission is very critical to 
the stability of Ghana and must not be po-
liticized. This is because a politicized EC is 
a recipe for conflict and mistrust and 
when mistrust compounds in the midst of 
a highly politicized country, tensions are 
heightened and the legitimacy and the va-
lidity of an electoral outcome will be chal-
lenged—The outcome of the Chief Jus-
tice's report concerning the commission 
certainly will have an impact on how the 
political environment of election 2020 
will look. The state of the office of the 
Electoral Commission of Ghana, therefore, 
is a frog in gradually boiling water: Its 
outcome will be undesirable if the neces-
sary steps are not taken to salvage the sit-
uation. 
The Electoral Commission of Ghana 
and Monetization of Parliamentary 
and   Presidential Contestations  
In Africa and beyond, money politics 
is not a recent phenomenon. This occur-
rence is most often than not associated 
with vote buying and electoral fraud.  It is 
a well-known fact that democracy is an 
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expensive system to operate in any coun-
try in terms of time and resources. But, 
should the expensive nature of the system 
(democracy) set money as the locus and 
centre of electoral competitions, where 
potential citizen are excluded from politi-
cal contestations? Undoubtedly, money is 
essential for the sustenance of the elec-
toral system but in instances where it is 
given the chance to occupy so much space 
the Ghanaian electoral politics, democra-
cy becomes moneycracy—a development 
that can cripple Ghana’s electoral success-
es and dent the credibility the Electoral 
Commission has built over the years. The 
answer to the earlier question is ideally a 
simple No if electoral democracy is in-
deed valued by Ghanaians.  Moreover, 
monetization breeds presidential and par-
liamentary corruption. Having used huge 
sums of money to get elected into public 
offices, the next move is to amass wealth 
to pay either their debtors, financiers, and 
also settle individuals who may have con-
tributed to their success. This fit into 
Stephan Limburg’s “it is our time to 
chop” (Lindberg, 2003). 
 MPPCs and Competitive Elections 
Monetization of Parliamentary and 
Presidential Contestations (MPPCs) em-
ployed by the researcher should be con-
ceived and understood as a situation 
where an Elections Management Body 
(EMB) to attach high financial commit-
ments to the filing fees for candidates 
(Political Parties or individuals) who are 
seeking to contest for presidential or par-
liamentary elections within a stipulated 
period of time—the failure to meet this 
requirement within the allotted time tan-
tamount to disqualification of candidates 
involved. This situation is also described 
by William (1997:169 ) as "monetization 
of the electoral process".  But for the pur-
pose of a defined scope, I use the MPPCs 
to paint a clear picture of the Ghanaian 
experience. 
Though democracy is expensive to 
practice, democracy is not a system for 
the rich. In this regard, poor persons with 
capable minds should be able to partici-
pate in the democratic process—
excessive monetization kills the potentials 
of affable leaders who are financially inca-
pacitated. For example, few weeks to the 
2016 election, the EC increased the filing 
fees from GHS1, 000 to GHS10, 000 for 
parliamentary candidates and from GHS5, 
000 to GHS50, 000 for presidential candi-
dates. The capricious decision by the 
Commission to increase the filing fee can 
inhibit the poor but capable of contesting 
parliamentary or presidential elections.   
Monetization, therefore, kills Politi-
cal Mobilizations. This is expressed in the 
concerns of the smaller political parties 
since their number does favour a sudden 
hike in filing fees to file their nominations. 
The PNC official was very passionate and 
vociferous on this, he argued that the EC 
GHC hike in parliamentary filing fees from 
GHC 1, 000 to GHC 10, 000 political par-
ties both dominant and smaller parties, 
within a short period to elections was in-
sensitive to the smaller political parties 
and an indirect way of reducing competi-
tion. The justification stems from the fact 
that since GHC 10, 000 could secure 4 mo-
torbikes to facilitate the campaign of the 
smaller parties but the EC requires it as a 
deposit. For example, the Northern part of 
Ghana have villages that are wide apart 
and so a motorbike is crucial to carry out 
village-to-village and house-to-house 
campaigns, one of the best ways to garner 
votes.  Such decision by the EC is no less 
reducing the campaign coverage of small-
er political parties since they are finan-
cially stretched, unlike the major political 
parties. Moreover, it has been argued that 
the government is a serious business and 
thus the players must be well to do or 
have the means to govern so as to reduce 
political kleptocracy. However, this notion 
is misleading as it rather hampers compe-
tition and gives too much attention to 
money rule. 
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Another negative impact of a reduc-
tion in the competition which is key to 
democracy the monetization had on the 
mobilization is that the announcement of 
the increment came late after the political 
parties and independent candidates have 
already budgeted for the filing fees al-
ready. The sudden increase necessitated 
dropping some the candidates for lack of 
funds: who do you drop and will must the 
party support? It brings division into the 
parties; this has been one of the main rea-
sons why some political parties are una-
ble to contest in some constituencies dur-
ing general elections (especially, the mi-
nor political parties). Though no inde-
pendent candidate dropped out of the 
2016 race, an Independent candidate who 
is unable to meet the financial require-
ment in future would have to step after a 
lot of resources has been utilized towards 
their political agenda or ambitions. This 
to a very large extent reduces competition 
in the contest for people's vote to manage 
the affair of the state. 
In spite of the fact that the monetiza-
tion focuses on the EC, it was revealed 
that monetization and vote buying is in-
creasingly becoming a part of the Ghana-
ian elections from the grassroots to the 
national level. The EC officials and the 
CSOs argued that the monetization at the 
political party's level is more worrisome. 
The concerns raised confirms media re-
portage on some key political actors who 
perceive the eminence of money politics 
destroying the quality of elections and 
political contests. For example, the revela-
tion confirms the observation made by 
the former Speaker of Parliament, Ed-
ward Doe Adjaho, who bemoan describing 
the excessive monetization as contrib-
uting to incessant corruption as well re-
duction in the quality of members of the 
house and the level of arguments and this 
could have negative implication for Par-
liamentary business (Gadugah, 2015). 
Relatedly, the data revealed that pol-
iticians resort to monetarist and material 
inducement tactics instead of ideas, poli-
cies and pragmatics agenda that could 
transform citizen's lives in order to bribe 
their way through a political contest to 
emerge—money wins power. This is con-
firmed by a fairly recent publication by 
Westminster Foundation in conjunction 
with the Center for Democratic Develop-
ment (CDD) in February 2018 (Debrah, et 
al., 2018). According to Dr Kojo Asante a 
senior research fellow at the CDD, the 
phenomena has been left unattended to, 
and for the matter, the data which mone-
tization is deteriorating Ghanaian Politics. 
This he opined, is a recipe for breeding 
‘godfathers’ who will “directly or indirect-
ly govern the country because they can 
afford to induce voters or sponsor other 
politicians to gain power with money”. 
Significantly, the monetization of the 
political contest by the EC according to 
the CSOs, Political Scientist, PNC and NDC 
officials could in the future make democ-
racy as an auction where the highest bid-
der gains access to political contest but 
those with laudable ideas and experience 
may be side-lined because of financial in-
hibitions.  For instance, democratic auc-
tioning could give room to "money laun-
derers", "drug barons" and even "terrorist 
groups" to sponsor individuals to hijack 
democracy due to the weighty money and 
resources at their disposal to cross the 
finish line. Though this observation is 
seemingly pessimistic, monetization of 
political contestations if unmanaged 
properly will further give tickets to peo-
ple with radical ideas to parliament or the 
executive arm of government, the result is 
the laws that are made will be radical, 
they people may rebel and the country 
will be destabilized. 
Lastly, research literature leads to 
the conclusion that “moneycracy” is sink-
ing very deep into the Ghanaian political 
contests. The research findings of the 
Westminster Foundation in conjunction 
with the Center for Democratic Develop-
ment (CDD) (also cited in Suhuyini, 2018.) 
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shows that ''it will cost a member of par-
liament USD$86,000 to secure a party's 
primary nomination to compete in parlia-
mentary elections in the country''. This 
notwithstanding, the findings also ad-
vanced that, the cost of running for a pub-
lic office (political office) in Ghana shot up 
to about 60% in the last four years (2012-
2016). There is, therefore, the need to de-
vice a proactive mechanism to address 
this political menace from eating into eve-
ry facet of political life—especially when 
the evidence points to two critical institu-
tions (political actors) namely the politi-
cal parties and the Electoral Commission 
of the electoral commission of Ghana.  
CONCLUSION 
The Ghanaian Electoral Commission 
is one of the best if not the best in Sub-
Saharan Africa. The evidence lies in the 
improved transparency and some level of 
credibility the constant and progressive 
electoral reforms that have been institut-
ed by the Commission in the past 24 
years. However, the fraud allegation 
against the Electoral Commission which 
was confirmed by the investigation of the 
Chief Justices Committee is a dent on the 
office of the EC and a threat to their credi-
bility, though new officers are in the pre-
sent in the driving seat of the commission. 
Indeed ineffective communication was 
found to be a major challenge the EC fac-
es, especially in the management of the 
Electoral Commission's website. Though 
the EC tries to put basic information 
online, it is sometimes difficult to access 
information because of temporal shut 
down of the site. The study revealed the 
lack of coordination in the information 
put out by the Commission through their 
communicators and the EC Chairperson 
and this creates suspicions and reduction 
of people's trust in the system. More so 
monetization of parliamentary and presi-
dential contestations by both the Elec-
toral Commission and the Political Parties 
was found to be a likely avenue for demo-
cratic auctioning where the highest bid-
der wins. The greater implication, there-
fore, lies in the level of democratic partici-
pation (broader participation) and com-
petition which is a prominent tenet in 
democratic governance. 
Ghana is deemed democratically 
consolidation by Samuel Huntington’s 
conceptualization through the “Two Turn-
over Test” theory. Though Ghana’s elec-
tion over the years has been generally 
peaceful, less violence, and relatively free 
and fair though the last two elections 
(2012 and 2016) recorded some infrac-
tions which call for more work. Critical 
among these are the excessive monetiza-
tion, ineffective communication and the 
dwindling public trust in the role of the 
EC. These challenges if unaddressed could 
hamper the furtherance of Ghana’s de-
mocracy in years to come.   Hence, the pa-
per recommends the following for consid-
eration, first, the EC should employ two or 
three IT specialists solely responsible for 
the management of the EC’s website to 
allow free flow of information. In the 
same vein, the EC needs to introduce an 
electronic transmission of electoral re-
sults which is faster and more efficient 
than the manual process. This will gradu-
ally eliminate the trending declaration of 
results by political parties before the cer-
tified results from the EC.  Secondly, IPAC 
should be expanded to include civil socie-
ty organizations and the media since 
there is no compact platform for the EC to 
interact with the media and the CSOs that 
are related to the work of the EC. This will 
ensure that election-related CSOs are a 
preview of the necessary information to 
avoid dissemination of inaccurate facts. 
Aside these, the EC must reenergize Re-
gional Interparty Advisory Committee 
(RIPAC) and District Interparty Advisory 
Committee (DIPAC) to further engage the 
political parties and CSOs and the media 
at both regional and district levels to 
build a formidable front for the dissemi-
nation of information at the grassroots.   
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Thirdly, there is the need for a com-
mittee to be set up to consider how a con-
stitutional amendment request could be 
made to amend Article 71 (2) of the 1992 
Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 
which states that “the President shall, act-
ing on the advice of the Council of State, 
appoint the Chairman, Deputy Chairmen, 
and other members of the Electoral Com-
mission.” This to a large extent will re-
duce if not to eradicate the tension and 
the level of executive interference that 
comes with the appointments to the Sev-
en-member Commission. Finally, there is 
the need for permanent staff screening 
and effective mechanism for recruiting 
new permanent staff at the EC to reduce 
the rate of partisan associations which 
tends to influence the decision of individ-
uals to put their party interest at the apex 
against the national interest. To wit, every 
staff of the commission must be screened 
by the Bureau tor National Investigations 
(BNI) whilst extending this screening to 
new staffs of the Commission with a ma-
jor focus on backgrounds checks. 
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